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 1 Introduction
One of the basic qualitative conclusions of the real options literature on the optimal exercise of
deferrable investment opportunities is that under risk neutrality increased uncertainty should de-
celerate the optimal timing of irreversible decisions by increasing the required rate of return and
expanding the continuation set where exercising the opportunity is suboptimal. The reason for this
observation is that even though increased uncertainty may have a positive impact on the expected
present value of the payo® received at exercise it simultaneously increases the value accrued by
postponing the decision further into the future (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Since the latter
of these two counteracting e®ects dominates the former, increased uncertainty tends to decelerate
the optimal timing of irreversible decisions. This intuitively appealing result is, however, based on
the assumption that from the point of view of the investor all the relevant probabilistic information
a®ecting the irreversible decision can be summarized into a single probability measure characterizing
completely the intertemporal stochastic behavior of the underlying state dynamics.
The aforementioned approach to irreversible decision making has been recently challenged on
the basis of the original work by Knight (1921) and the subsequent work by Ellsberg (1961).
According to Knight (1921) economic decision makers face two type of uncertainties; namely,
measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty. Measurable uncertainty is typically labeled as risk and
it can be analyzed on the basis of a single probability measure characterizing the stochastic behavior
of the underlying factors a®ecting economic decisions. The second type of these uncertainties,
which is typically called either Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, cannot be measured and it
can be interpreted as the degree of uncertainty on the plausibility or credibility of a particular
probability measure characterizing the probabilistic structure of the alternative states of the world.
Since the latter of this types of uncertainties is more prevalent in economic decision making, studies
focusing solely on risk overlook a key factor a®ecting real economic decision making problems.
In light of the Ellsberg Paradox, the distinction of these two types of uncertainties is important
as decision makers prefer to act on the basis of known probabilities rather than on the basis of
ambiguous or unsure probabilities (Ellsberg (1961) and Epstein and Wang (1994)). Based on
the pioneering work by Knight (1921) and the subsequent research by Ellsberg (1961) ambiguity
was ¯rst rigorously axiomatized in a atemporal multiple priors setting by Gilboa and Schmeidler
1(1989) (for further extensions and re¯nements, see also Epstein (1999), Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002), and Maccheroni et al. (2006)). Their axiomatization was subsequently extended into
an intertemporal recursive multiple priors setting in Chen and Epstein (2002) and Epstein and
Schneider (2003) (see also Epstein and Wang (1994)).
The impact of Knightian uncertainty on optimal timing decisions was ¯rst investigated by
Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) in a job search model. The impact of Knightian uncertainty on the
optimal investment timing decisions were subsequently investigated by Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)
in a continuous time model based on geometric Brownian motion and in Miao and Wang (2007) in a
model based on a general discrete time Feller-continuous Markov process. An important conclusions
of these studies is that Knightian uncertainty a®ects irreversible decisions in a way which radically
di®ers from the impact of risk. Even though increased risk tends to decelerate optimal timing,
increased ambiguity may lead to a completely opposite conclusion. The reason for this observation
is that higher Knightian uncertainty decreases the con¯dence of the decision maker on the credibility
of the probability distribution describing the stochastic behavior of the underlying state variable.
Consequently, a rational decision maker becomes more reluctant to postpone the timing of the
decision further into the future on the basis of this potentially more biased probability distribution
(Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)). Miao and Wang (2007) also showed that the impact of higher
ambiguity on the optimal timing policy depends heavily on the intertemporal speci¯cation of the
exercise payo®. More precisely, they proved that the impact of Knightian uncertainty on the optimal
timing decision depends on the relative degrees of ambiguity about continuation and termination
payo®s (Miao and Wang (2007)). An important implication of their ¯ndings on the optimal timing
of exit is that higher Knightian uncertainty may lead to the optimality of the standard myopic
NPV-rule for extremely high degrees of ambiguity aversion.
The objective of this study is to extend part of the analysis of Miao and Wang (2007) to
the continuous time setting and investigate how Knightian uncertainty a®ects the optimal timing
policies of an uncertainty averse and risk neutral investor in the case where the underlying state
variable is modeled as a one dimensional di®usion and both the continuation and the termination
payo®s are monotone. We assume that Knightian uncertainty is characterized by ·-ignorance and,
therefore, ambiguity is introduced by assuming that instead of facing a single probability measure
2the investor faces a continuum of equivalent measures de¯ned by a parameterized family of likelihood
ratios (cf. Chen and Epstein (2002) and Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)). Along the lines of the
¯ndings by Miao and Wang (2007) and Nishimura and Ozaki (2007), we ¯nd that the sign of
the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty on the value of the optimal timing policy of an
uncertainty averse investor is unambiguously negative. The same conclusion is shown to be valid
for the value of arbitrary single threshold policies. However, as indicated by the results of Miao
and Wang (2007), the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing policy is
proven to depend on the precise inter-temporal speci¯cation of the exercise payo®. More precisely,
in the case where the termination payo® is independent of future uncertainties, increased Knightian
uncertainty accelerates the optimal timing policy of an uncertainty averse investor by shrinking
the continuation region where exercising is suboptimal. The reason for this result is that in that
case higher Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of the optimal policy while it simultaneously
leaves the termination payo® unchanged. Since exercising the opportunity is suboptimal as long as
the value of the opportunity dominates the termination payo®, we ¯nd that increased Knightian
uncertainty unambiguously accelerates rational exercise in that case. However, if the termination
payo® depends on the evolution of the state variable after exercise as well, then the impact of higher
Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing policy is ambiguous. In that case increased Knightian
uncertainty decreases the value of the optimal policy. However, since it simultaneously decreases the
expected payo® as well, the net impact of higher Knightian uncertainty is ambiguous and depends on
its relative impact on the value of waiting and the termination payo® (cf. Miao and Wang (2007)).
The contents of this study are as follows. In section two we specify the underlying ambiguous
stochastic dynamics and introduce the considered optimal timing problem. In section three we then
investigate the impact of Knightian uncertainty on standard threshold policies and their values. The
main ¯ndings on the optimal timing policy of an uncertainty averse and risk neutral investor are
then presented in section four. Our general ¯ndings are then explicitly illustrated in section ¯ve in
a model based on geometric Brownian motion. Finally, section six concludes our study.
32 The Model
We assume that the underlying state variable evolves according to a linear, time homogeneous, and
regular di®usion process de¯ned on the complete ¯ltered probability space (­;P;fFtgt¸0;F) and
evolving on the state-space I = (a;b) µ R according to the dynamics described by the It^ o-stochastic
di®erential equation
dXt = ¹(Xt)dt + ¾(Xt)dBt; X0 = x; (2.1)
where Bt denotes standard P-Brownian motion. We assume that the drift coe±cient ¹ : I 7! R and
the di®usion coe±cient ¾ : I 7! R+ are locally Lipschitz-continuous functions satisfying the standard
growth condition and that ¾(x) > 0 for all x 2 I. These assumptions guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of a strong solution for the stochastic di®erential equation (2.1) (cf. Karatzas and Shreve
(1991), Theorem 2.9 on p. 289). Finally, we also assume that the boundaries of the state-space
of the underlying di®usion are natural and, therefore, that the underlying state variable X cannot
reach its boundaries in ¯nite time (for a characterization of the boundary behavior of di®usions, see
Borodin and Salminen (2002) pp. 14{21).
In order to characterize the ambiguity faced by the uncertainty averse decision maker, we
now follow Chen and Epstein (2002) (see also Nishimura and Ozaki (2007)) and introduce the
parameterized family of positive exponential martingales (Wald's martingale)
Zµ
t = e¡µBt¡ 1
2µ2t;
where the parameter µ 2 [¡·;·] and · 2 R+ is a constant measuring the degree of Knightian
uncertainty (known also as ·-ignorance; cf. Chen and Epstein (2002)). Given the exponential
martingale Zµ
t we can now de¯ne the parameterized family of equivalent measures Qµ on Ft by the
likelihood-ratio dQµ=dP = Zµ
t . A standard application of the Girsanov theorem then implies that
Wµ
t = Bt + µt
is a Ft-martingale with respect to the equivalent measure Qµ (cf. Theorem 8.6.4 in Âksendal (2003)
and Borodin and Salminen (2002) pp. 48{50). Hence, for any given ¯xed µ and equivalent measure
Qµ we have
dXt = (¹(Xt) ¡ µ¾(Xt))dt + ¾(Xt)dWµ
t ; X0 = x: (2.2)
4As usually, we denote the di®erential operator associated to the underlying di®usion characterized










It is well-known from the classical literature on linear di®usions that there are two linearly inde-
pendent fundamental solutions Ãµ(x) and 'µ(x) satisfying a set of appropriate boundary conditions
based on the boundary behavior of the underlying process X and spanning the set of solutions of
the ordinary di®erential equation (Aµu)(x) = ru(x), where r > 0 denotes the prevailing constant
discount rate (see Borodin and Salminen (2002), pp. 18 { 19, for a comprehensive characterization
of these fundamental solutions). These fundamental solutions constitute the minimal r-excessive
mappings for the underlying di®usion. Since any non-trivial r-excessive function can be expressed
as a linear combination of these functions (see Borodin and Salminen (2002), p. 33, for a precise
characterization) and the value of the optimal timing policy is r-excessive, we observe that the




µ(x); where Bµ > 0 denotes the constant Wronskian of









denotes the density of the scale function of X. Following Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) we assume
throughout this study that the relations among the underlying variables are not altered as the
horizon tends to in¯nity and, therefore, that the ¯nite horizon characterization remains valid in the
in¯nite horizon setting as well.
Given the underlying stochastically °uctuating state variable Xt and the parameter µ 2 [¡·;·],
denote now as L1
µ the class of pro¯t °ows having a ¯nite expected cumulative present value under
the measure Qµ. For any cash °ow ¼ 2 L1







As is known from the classical theory of di®usions, the expected cumulative present value (Rµ
r¼)(x)
of a cash °ow ¼ 2 L1
















µ(x)) denotes the density of the speed measure of the underlying state
process Xt under the measure Qµ.
Our objective is to analyze how Knightian uncertainty characterized by ·-ignorance a®ects
the optimal timing policies of a risk neutral and uncertainty averse investor in the case where the
underlying state dynamics are characterized by a continuous di®usion process. To this end, we now
plan to investigate the optimal timing problem











where ¿ is an arbitrary stopping time, ¼ : I 7! R is a known continuous cash °ow accrued from
continuing operation, and the exercise payo® g : I 7! R is a known continuous function which is
assumed to be bounded from below. It is at this point worth emphasizing that in the optimal timing
problem (2.4) both the measure as well as the optimal stopping rule are determined by the investor.
More precisely, the parameter µ capturing the degree of ambiguity faced by the uncertainty averse
investor is ¯rst chosen so as to minimize the expected present value of the exercise payo® at any
state. The timing rule is then chosen so as to maximize the value of the timing policy in this worst
case scenario.
In order to derive the solution of the optimal timing problem (2.4) and characterize how it is
associated to the value of standard timing problems in the absence of ambiguity, we also consider










It is clear that in the absence of Knightian uncertainty (i.e. when · = 0) the considered problem
coincides with a standard optimal investment timing problem de¯ned with respect to the underlying
state dynamics characterized by (2.1). As soon as Knightian uncertainty is introduced and the
maximum degree of uncertainty satis¯es the inequality · > 0 there is a continuum of equivalent
measures Qµ and, therefore, a continuum of associated optimal timing problems indexed by the
parameter µ 2 [¡·;·].
63 Ambiguity and Threshold Policies
Before proceeding to the analysis of the general investment timing problem of an uncertainty averse
investor, we ¯rst investigate how Knightian uncertainty a®ects the value of ordinary single threshold
policies arising typically in the literature focusing on real options and the timing of irreversible
investment decisions. We ¯rst state the following auxiliary result needed in the proof of our main
results and the analysis of the comparative static properties of the optimal timing rules and their
values in a broad class of investment timing problems.
Lemma 3.1. Let ¿y = infft ¸ 0 : Xt = yg denote the ¯rst hitting time of the underlying state





















































for all x 2 I.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1 states an unambiguous characterization of how the parameter µ a®ects the expected
present value of a unit of money received at the ¯rst date the underlying state variable hits an
arbitrary constant threshold (i.e. the current value of a zero coupon bond maturing at the random
date ¿y). According to Lemma 3.1 this expected value is monotonic as a function of the parameter
µ. This result is important since it proves that the parameterized family of expected present values
7attain its extreme values (as functions of Knightian uncertainty) on the boundaries of the compact
set [¡·;·]. Since increased Knightian uncertainty constitutes a symmetric enlargement of the set
[¡·;·], we ¯nd that Lemma 3.1 also establishes that the sign of the relationship between increased
Knightian uncertainty and the parameterized expected present value is unambiguously negative.
A second set of auxiliary results summarizing our main ¯ndings on the sensitivity of the expected
cumulative present value of a monotone cash °ow with respect to changes in the parameter µ is now
summarized in the following.
Lemma 3.2. (A) Assume that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1




r¼)(x) for all x 2 I. Especially, infµ2[¡·;·](Rµ
r¼)(x) = (R·
r¼)(x) for all x 2 I.
(B) Assume that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1




for all x 2 I. Especially, infµ2[¡·;·](Rµ
r¼)(x) = (R¡·
r ¼)(x) for all x 2 I.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3.2 extends the ¯ndings of Lemma 3.1 to the expected cumulative present values of
monotonic cash °ows. Interestingly, and in line with the ¯ndings of Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2 shows
that the sign of the relationship between the parameter µ and the expected cumulative present value
depends on whether the cash °ow is increasing or decreasing. In case the cash °ow is increasing
(decreasing) this relationship is negative (positive). Hence, Lemma 3.2 demonstrates that increased
Knightian uncertainty decreases the expected cumulative present value of monotone cash °ows.
In light of the results of Lemma 3.1 we now introduce the family of functionals F
y
µ : I 7! R and
G
y
µ : I 7! R indexed by the parameter µ and de¯ned as
F
y

















where ¿(z;y) = infft ¸ 0 : Xt 62 (z;y)g denotes the ¯rst exit time of the underlying state variable X
from the open interval (z;y) ½ I. It is clear that these functionals measure the expected present
value of the cumulative payo® accrued by following a timing policy characterized by the hitting
8time to a ¯xed single threshold. Given these de¯nitions, we can now establish the following inter-
esting result characterizing how Knightian uncertainty a®ects the values and continuation regions
of standard threshold policies arising in real option models of irreversible investment.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that ^ µ ¸ µ and that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1
µ has a ¯nite expected cumulative







g(x) x ¸ y
(Rµ
r¼)(x) + (g(y) ¡ (Rµ
r¼)(y))
Ãµ(x)










r¼)(x) + (g(y) ¡ (Rµ
r¼)(y))
'µ(x)
'µ(y) x > y




µ(x) ¸ 0 for x 2 (a;y), then F
y
µ (x) ¸ F
y
^ µ (x) for all x 2 I, infµ2[¡·;·]fF
y
µ (x)g = F
y
·(x),
and fx 2 I : F
y
^ µ (x) > g(x)g µ fx 2 I : F
y
µ (x) > g(x)g
(ii) if G0








·(x), and fx 2 I :
G
y




µ(x) · 0 for x 2 (a;y), then F
y
µ (x) · F
y
^ µ (x) for all x 2 I, infµ2[¡·;·]fF
y
µ (x)g = F
y
¡·(x),
and fx 2 I : F
y
µ (x) > g(x)g µ fx 2 I : F
y
^ µ (x) > g(x)g
(iv) if G0








¡·(x), and fx 2 I :
G
y
µ(x) > g(x)g µ fx 2 I : G
y
^ µ(x) > g(x)g.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 3.3 states a set of su±cient conditions under which the impact of increased Knightian
uncertainty on both the value as well as the continuation region where the value dominates the
exercise payo® can be unambiguously characterized. According to Theorem 3.3, the sign of the
relationship between higher Knightian uncertainty and the expected present value of the total payo®
(the sum of continuation and termination payo®s) accrued from following a threshold policy depends
9on the monotonicity of the value as a function of the present state of the underlying stochastically
°uctuating state variable which, in turn, depends on the relative sizes of the termination and
continuation payo®s. Under the conditions of Theorem 3.3, increased Knightian uncertainty is
shown to decrease the value of a threshold policy by decreasing both the expected cumulative present
value of the cash °ow accrued prior exercise and the expected present value of the termination
payo®. Theorem 3.3 also characterizes how higher Knightian uncertainty a®ects the continuation
region where the value of a threshold policy dominates the exercise payo®. Interestingly, under the
conditions of our theorem, higher Knightian uncertainty is shown to have a stimulating e®ect on
timing by shrinking the continuation region where the value dominates the exercise payo®. Naturally,
this result is based on our assumptions on the relative sizes of the termination and continuation
payo®s. As our subsequent explicit illustrations will indicate, if these conditions are not met, then
our principal ¯ndings may actually be reversed. It is also worth emphasizing that our observations
indicate that the sign of the relationship between Knightian uncertainty and the expected values of
single threshold policies is essentially based on ¯rst order monotonicity properties while the impact
of increased risk (measured by volatility) is typically based on the second order convexity properties
of the values as functions of the underlying state variable. This observation is of interest since it
indicates that the impact of these two types of uncertainties on the value of standard threshold
policies may be drastically di®erent.
4 Knightian Uncertainty and Optimal Timing
Up to now, we have only considered the impact of Knightian uncertainty on the value of potentially
suboptimal timing strategies which are characterizable as ordinary threshold policies requiring that
the underlying state variable is stopped whenever it crosses a predetermined constant threshold.
However, due to uncertainty aversion it is not clear wether the optimal timing policies are actually
characterizable as ordinary threshold strategies or not. Fortunately, as the analysis of our previous
section already indicated, the optimal timing policy of an uncertainty averse investor can be de-
termined in typical cases subject to monotone payo®s from an ordinary optimal stopping problem
de¯ned with respect a unique well-de¯ned equivalent measure.
10Theorem 4.1. (A) Assume that the exercise payo® g(x) and the cash °ow ¼(x) are non-decreasing
and continuous. Then, V (x) = infµ2[¡·;·] Vµ(x) = V·(x), that is,









(B) Assume that the exercise payo® payo® g(x) and the cash °ow ¼(x) are non-increasing and
continuous. Then, V (x) = infµ2[¡·;·] Vµ(x) = V¡·(x), that is,









In both cases (A) and (B) increased Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of the investment
opportunity and accelerates rational exercise by shrinking the continuation region where waiting is
optimal.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 4.1 extends the ¯ndings of Theorem 3.3 to the case where the investment timing pol-
icy is chosen optimally. Along the lines of Theorem 3.3 we again ¯nd that the monotonicity of the
value of the optimal timing policy as function of the current state of the underlying state variable
is the principal determinant of the sign of the relationship between increased Knightian uncertainty
and the value of the optimal policy. More speci¯cally, Theorem 4.1 proves that increased Knightian
uncertainty unambiguously decreases the value of the optimal timing policy of an uncertainty averse
investor whenever the continuation and termination payo®s are monotone. Within our modeling
framework, higher Knightian uncertainty increases uniformly the plausibility of favorable as well as
unfavorable scenarios. However, since an uncertainty averse investor bases her timing decision on
the worst case scenario, only the unfavorable cases count and, therefore, higher Knightian uncer-
tainty unambiguously decreases the value of the optimal timing policy. Theorem 4.1 also proves
that higher Knightian uncertainty unambiguously accelerates optimal timing by shrinking the con-
tinuation region where exercising the opportunity is suboptimal. The reason for this observation
is that increased Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of the optimal timing policy and leaves
the termination payo® unchanged. Since timing is suboptimal as long as the value dominates the
termination payo®, we ¯nd that increased Knightian uncertainty accelerates timing. An interesting
11implication of the conclusions of Theorem 4.1 on optimal exit policies of uncertainty averse ¯rms is
summarized in the following.
Theorem 4.2. (A) Assume that g(x) ´ 0 and that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1
· is continuous, non-
decreasing, and satis¯es the limiting conditions limx#a ¼(x) < 0 < limx"b ¼(x). Then, the value (2.4)
of the optimal exit policy of an uncertainty averse investor is
V (x) = (R·

















·) x > x¤
·
0 x · x¤
·;
where the optimal exit threshold x¤
· = argminf(R·
r¼)(x)='·(x)g 2 ¼¡1(R¡) is the unique root of the








(B) Assume that g(x) ´ 0 and that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1
¡· is, continuous, non-increasing, and
satis¯es the limiting conditions limx#a ¼(x) > 0 > limx"b ¼(x). Then, the value (2.4) of the optimal
exit policy of an uncertainty averse investor is
V (x) = (R¡·

















¡·) x < x¤
¡·
0 x ¸ x¤
¡·;
where the optimal entry threshold x¤
¡· = argminf(R¡·
r ¼)(x)=Ã¡·(x)g 2 ¼¡1(R¡) is the unique root








(C) Increased Knightian uncertainty accelerates exit by decreasing the value of the optimal exit policy
of a uncertainty averse investor.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Theorem 4.2 characterizes the impact of higher Knightian uncertainty on the optimal exit pol-
icy of an uncertainty investor. Along the lines of our Theorem 4.1 we ¯nd that increased Knightian
uncertainty decreases the value of the optimal timing policy and accelerates optimal exit by de-
creasing the value and leaving the termination payo® unchanged. This result is interesting since
it demonstrates that the impact of Knightian uncertainty is radically di®erent with the impact of
increased risk (as measured by volatility).
It is worth noticing that the qualitative conclusions of Theorem 4.1 are valid only when the
exercise payo® is independent of the degree of Knightian uncertainty. Even though this assumption
12is satis¯ed in cases where the valuation is based on the behavior of the underlying up to the exercise
date, it is obviously violated in studies considering optimal entry decisions under uncertainty. The
reason for this argument is that in those cases the exercise payo® depends both on the prevailing
market conditions as well as on their uncertain behavior after the entry opportunity has been
exercised. In the optimal entry case, the considered optimal timing problems can typically be
expressed as



















The conclusions of Theorem 4.1 are partially extended to this optimal entry case in the following.
Theorem 4.3. (A) Assume that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1
· is continuous, non-decreasing, and satis¯es
the limiting conditions limx#a ¼(x) < 0 < limx"b ¼(x). Then, the value (4.3) of the optimal entry
policy of an uncertainty averse investor is



















·) x < x¤
·;
where the optimal entry threshold x¤
· = argmaxf(R·
r¼)(x)=Ã·(x)g 2 ¼¡1(R+) is the unique root of








(B) Assume that the cash °ow ¼ 2 L1
¡· is, continuous, non-increasing, and satis¯es the limiting
conditions limx#a ¼(x) > 0 > limx"b ¼(x). Then, the value (4.3) of the optimal entry policy of the
uncertainty averse investor is
















¡·) x > x¤
¡·
(R¡·
r ¼)(x) x · x¤
¡·;
where the optimal entry threshold x¤
¡· = argmaxf(R¡·
r ¼)(x)='¡·(x)g 2 ¼¡1(R+) is the unique root








(C) Increased Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of the optimal entry policy of an uncertainty
averse investor.
Proof. See Appendix F.
13Theorem 4.3 characterizes the optimal entry policy and its value in the presence of Knightian
uncertainty. Along the lines of the ¯ndings of Theorem 4.1 we ¯nd that the monotonicity of the
cash °ow is again the principal factor determining the sensitivity of the value of the optimal timing
policy with respect to changes in the degree of Knightian uncertainty. However, in contrast with
the ¯ndings of Theorem 4.1, we now observe that the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty
on the optimal entry threshold cannot be typically characterized unambiguously. As was already
argued before our theorem, the reason for this ¯nding is that in the present case Knightian uncer-
tainty a®ects directly both the value of the optimal entry policy as well as the termination payo®
measuring the expected cumulative present value of the cash °ow accrued from the entry date up
to an arbitrarily distant future. Since the continuation region where exercising the opportunity is
suboptimal reads as fx 2 I : Vµ(x) > (Rµ
r¼)(x)g, we ¯nd that the sign of the relationship between
increased Knightian uncertainty and the optimal threshold depends on the relative impact on these
two factors.
It is worth emphasizing that our observations on the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty
on the optimal timing of exercise are in line with the ¯ndings by Miao and Wang (2007) obtained
in a discrete time setting. More precisely, Miao and Wang (2007) established in their study
that ambiguity may accelerate or decelerate option exercise depending on its relative impact on
the continuation and on the termination payo®s. As our results indicate, the same conclusion is
partially valid in the continuous time setting as well. Unfortunately, establishing an unambiguous
characterization of the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing of entry
is in the present setting a demanding task. However, as our subsequent explicit illustrations will
establish, the qualitative conclusions by Miao and Wang (2007) are satis¯ed in the case where the
underlying dynamics follow geometric Brownian motion.
Having established an unambiguous characterization of the impact of increased Knightian un-
certainty on the value of optimal timing policies in the presence of uncertainty aversion, it would
naturally be of interest to present such an unambiguous characterization for the impact of increased
volatility (or risk) as well. Unfortunately, this is generally impossible since in the presence of Knight-
ian uncertainty increased volatility a®ects the rate at which the underlying state variable is expected
to grow as well. We will illustrate this observation in an explicitly parameterized example based on
14geometric Brownian motion in the following section.
5 Illustration: Geometric Brownian Motion
In order to illustrate our general results explicitly, we ¯rst assume that the underlying stochastic
dynamics follow an ordinary geometric Brownian motion characterized under the equivalent measure
Qµ by the stochastic di®erential equation
dXt = (¹ ¡ µ¾)Xtdt + ¾XtdBµ
t; X0 = x: (5.1)



































denotes the negative root of the characteristic equation ¾2w(w¡1)+2(¹¡µ¾)w¡2r = 0. Standard
















2¸µ(¾ + µ ¡ ¾¸µ)
¾2(¸µ ¡ ºµ)








2ºµ(¾ + µ ¡ ¾ºµ)
¾2(¸µ ¡ ºµ)




To illustrate our general ¯ndings on the comparative static properties of the optimal timing
policy and its value, we now consider four di®erent examples arising in the literature on real options.
In order to illustrate the dependence of the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty on the nature
of the continuation and termination payo®s, we ¯rst consider the valuation and optimal exercise
policy of a standard investment opportunity. In that case the exercise payo® reads as g(x) =
15(x¡K)+, where K > 0 is a known exogenously determined sunk cost. Given the monotonicity and
independence of the prevailing degree of Knightian uncertainty of the lump-sum exercise payo®, we
notice that if the condition r > ¹ ¡ ¾·, guaranteeing that Ã· > 1, is satis¯ed then the value of the
optimal investment strategy of an uncertainty averse investor reads as





















In light of our results on the sensitivity of the root ¸· with respect to changes in the degree of
Knightian uncertainty we observe that increased Knightian uncertainty accelerates rational exercise
by decreasing the optimal investment threshold x¤
·. The impact of higher volatility is naturally
ambiguous due to the non-monotonicity of the root ¸· as a function of the volatility coe±cient ¾.
As a second example, consider the case where the exercise payo® reads as g(x) = (K ¡ x)+ (a
perpetual put). In contrast to our previous example, the exercise payo® is now non-increasing. It
is well-known that as long as the absence of speculative bubbles condition r > ¹ + ·¾ is satis¯ed,













K ¡ x x · x¤
¡·






Given the monotonicity of the root º¡· as a function of the degree of Knightian uncertainty we
notice in accordance with the ¯ndings of our Theorem 4.1 that increased Knightian uncertainty
accelerates investment timing by increasing the threshold x¤
¡· and decreasing the value V¡·(x) of
the investment opportunity.
In order to analyze the e®ects of Knightian uncertainty a®ects the continuation payo® as well,








r ¡ ¹ + ¾·
whenever the absence of speculative bubbles condition r > ¹ ¡ ¾· is met, we ¯nd that in this case
the exercise payo® reads as
g(x) =
x
r ¡ ¹ + ¾·
¡ K:
Applying a similar approach than in the former example proves that the value of the optimal entry
strategy of an uncertainty averse investor reads as












x < ¹ x·







rK 2 ((r ¡ ¹ + ¾·)K;1):
As indicated by our Theorem 4.3, the value of the optimal entry policy is a decreasing function of
the prevailing degree of Knightian uncertainty ·. Again, the impact of increased volatility on the
optimal entry threshold is ambiguous due to the non-monotonicity of the root º· as a function of










we ¯nd in that higher Knightian uncertainty decelerates optimal entry by increasing the optimal
entry threshold at which the opportunity is exercised. This observation is of interest since it indi-
cates that even though the sign of the relationship between ambiguity and the value of the optimal
timing policy is determined by the ¯rst order monotonicity properties of the exercise payo®, Knigh-
tian uncertainty may either decelerate or accelerate optimal investment depending on whether the
decision is based on a continuous °ow of revenues or a single lump-sum payo® accrued at exercise.
1The entry threshold simpli¯es to the proposed form after noticing that for any a 2 R we have











17Finally, consider as our fourth example the optimal exit problem of an uncertainty averse ¯rm
(cf. Alvarez (1998) for an analysis in the standard real option setting). In the present case, the
optimal timing problem reads as









where c > 0 denotes a °ow of constant costs associated to continuing operation. Along the lines of
our ¯ndings on the optimal entry problem we ¯nd that whenever the absence of speculative bubbles
condition r > ¹ ¡ ¾· is met, the considered optimal exit problem reads
V (x) =
x















r ¡ ¹ + ¾·
¶¸
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x > ¹ x·
0 x · ¹ x·;








As was established in our Theorem 4.3 increased Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of the










we ¯nd that increased Knightian uncertainty accelerates optimal exit of an uncertainty averse in-
vestor by increasing the threshold at which exit is optimal. This observation again emphasizes the
radically di®erent impact increased Knightian uncertainty has on investment incentives depending
on the intertemporal properties of the exercise payo®.
6 Concluding Comments
In this paper we considered the impact of Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing policy of a
risk neutral and uncertainty averse investor. According to our general results, increased Knightian
uncertainty unambiguously decreases the value of the optimal timing policy in all cases. However,
18our ¯ndings demonstrated that the impact of higher Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing
policy depends on the intertemporal speci¯cation of the exercise payo®. If the exercise payo® is of
the lump-sum type and independent of the future evolution of the underlying state variable, then
increased Knightian uncertainty accelerates optimal timing by shrinking the continuation region
where exercising is suboptimal. In the case where the exercise payo® depends on the future evolution
of the underlying state variable and thereby on the prevailing degree of Knightian uncertainty, the
impact of an increase in Knightian uncertainty on the timing is ambiguous and depends on its
relative impact on the value of waiting and on the expected present value of the termination payo®.
Whichever of these two counteracting e®ects dominates dictates the sign of the relationship between
higher Knightian uncertainty and optimal timing.
Even though our results are based on a relatively general continuous time description of the
underlying state variable, a natural extension of our study would be to extend our analysis to a
multidimensional setting by introducing more underlying factors subject to Knightian uncertainty.
Such an extension would provide valuable information on the combined impact of potentially com-
plex interactions between various risks and Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing policy of
an uncertainty averse decision maker (cf. Chen and Epstein (2002)). Analogously, in light of
our results on the impact of Knightian uncertainty on single investment timing decisions, it would
naturally be of interest to study how Knightian uncertainty a®ects the irreversible accumulation
policies and, especially, the value of growth and divestment options of uncertainty averse investors.
A third natural economically interesting extension would be to consider the impact of ambiguity
on the optimal risk adoption policies of uncertainty averse investors (cf. Alvarez and Stenbacka
(2004)). In that case both the continuation payo® as well as the termination payo® depend on both
the prevailing and on the future uncertainties. Thus, as our present analysis indicates, the impact of
Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing policy and its value may be under such circumstances
a non-monotonic function of the prevailing degree of Knightian uncertainty. Wether this conclusion
is correct or not is an interesting research topic left for future research.
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21A Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Consider ¯rst the case where x · y. It is well-known from the literature on the classical









where Ãµ(x) the increasing fundamental solution of the ordinary di®erential equation (Aµu)(x) =
ru(x). Since µ · ^ µ we observe that the monotonicity of Ãµ(x) and the positivity of the di®usion
coe±cient ¾(x) implies that
(A^ µÃµ)(x) ¡ rÃµ(x) = ((A^ µ ¡ Aµ)Ãµ)(x) = (µ ¡ ^ µ)¾(x)Ã0
µ(x) · 0















proving inequality (3.1). Establishing inequality (3.2) is now entirely analogous. It remains to
establish inequalities (3.3) and (3.4). To accomplish this task we notice that inequality (3.1) implies




















Applying the mean value theorem of integral calculus and letting x " y proves (3.3). Establishing
inequality (3.4) is analogous.
B Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. (A) It is known from the literature on linear di®usions that for ¼ 2 L1
µ the expected cumu-
lative present value (Rµ
r¼)(x) constitutes the unique bounded solution of the ordinary di®erential
equation (AµRµ
r¼)(x) ¡ r(Rµ
r¼)(x) + ¼(x) = 0. In light of this identity we ¯nd that
(A^ µRµ
r¼)(x) ¡ r(Rµ
r¼)(x) + ¼(x) = (µ ¡ ^ µ)¾(x)(Rµ
r¼)0(x) < 0
22since the expected cumulative present value preserves the monotonicity of the cash °ow, ¾(x) > 0

















where Tn = n ^ infft ¸ 0 : Xt 62 (max(a + 1=n;¡n);min(n;b ¡ 1=n))g, n 2 N, is an increasing
sequence of almost surely ¯nite stopping times tending towards 1 as n ! 1. Letting n ! 1 and




for all x 2 I. Establishing part (B) is analogous.
C Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Applying the strong Markov property, the time homogeneity, and the continuity of the un-
derlying di®usion shows that for all x 2 (a;y) we have
F
y
























µ (x) = g(x) for all x 2 (y;b) proves the representation (3.7). Establishing (3.8) is
entirely analogous.
It remains to characterize the impact of increased Knightian uncertainty on the value of an
ordinary threshold policy and on the continuation region where the value of the threshold policy
dominates the termination payo®. Assume ¯rst that F
y
µ





^ µ (x) for all x 2 (y;b) it is su±cient to consider the behavior of F
y
µ (x) on the set (a;y). As is known
from the literature on linear di®usions, F
y
µ (x) satis¯es on (a;y) the boundary value problem
(AµF
y
µ )(x) ¡ rF
y
µ (x) + ¼(x) = 0; F
y
µ (y) = g(y):
Relying now on the proof of Lemma 3.2 proves that F
y
µ (x) ¸ F
y
^ µ (x) for all x 2 (a;y) and, therefore,
that F
y
µ (x) ¸ F
y
^ µ (x) for all x 2 I. If fx 2 I : F
y
µ (x) > g(x)g = ; then fx 2 I : F
y
^ µ (x) > g(x)g = ;
as well. Assume, therefore, that fx 2 I : F
y
µ (x) > g(x)g 6= ; and let x 2 fx 2 I : F
y
^ µ (x) > g(x)g.
23Since F
y
µ (x) ¸ F
y
^ µ (x), we ¯nd that x 2 fx 2 I : F
y
µ (x) > g(x)g as well and, therefore, that
fx 2 I : F
y
^ µ (x) > g(x)g µ fx 2 I : F
y
µ (x) > g(x)g. Establishing the claims of parts (ii), (iii), and
(iv) is completely analogous.
D Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. De¯ne the functional UT
µ : [0;T] £ I 7! R as
UT








where g : I 7! R is the known continuous payo® received at exercise and ¼(x) is the cash °ow which
is accumulated prior exercise. Under our assumptions UT
µ (t;x) constitutes for (t;x) 2 [0;T]£I the







µ (t;x) + ¼(x) = 0
UT
µ (T;x) = g(x);
where the di®erential operator Gµ
r is de¯ned for su±ciently smooth mappings f : I 7! R by
(Gµ
rf)(x) = (Aµf)(x) ¡ rf(x). Standard di®erentiation now shows that for all ^ µ > µ and (t;x) 2
[0;T] £ I we have
(Gµ
rUT









In light of this result we ¯nd by applying It^ o's theorem to the mapping (t;x) 7! e¡rtUT


















Since the expected value UT
µ (t;x) preserves the monotonicity of the exercise payo® g(x) and the
















for all (t;x) 2 [0;T]£I whenever the exercise payo® g(x) and the cash °ow ¼(x) are non-decreasing
and that the opposite inequality is valid whenever the exercise payo® g(x) and the cash °ow ¼(x)
























in the latter case.
In light of these inequalities, assume now that both the exercise payo® g(x) and the cash
°ow ¼(x) are non-decreasing and consider the increasing sequence of functions fvn(x)gn2Z+ de¯ned



















for k ¸ 1. As is known from the literature on optimal stopping the sequence vn(x) converges towards
the value of the optimal stopping problem (2.4) and, therefore, that








proving our ¯rst claim. Establishing the alleged claim in the case where the exercise payo® g(x) and
the cash °ow ¼(x) are non-increasing is completely analogous. The alleged sensitivities of the value
of the optimal policy and the continuation region where exercising the opportunity is suboptimal
now follow from Theorem 3.3.
E Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. (A) We consider the optimal exit problem for an arbitrary µ since the monotonicity of the
solution as a function of the parameter µ is then su±cient for deriving the optimal policy of an






















25Since ¼(x) > 0 for all x 2 (¼¡1(0);1) we observe that (L'µ(Rµ
r¼))(x) > 0 for all x 2 (¼¡1(0);1).
Assume now that k < ¼¡1(0). The monotonicity of the cash °ow ¼(x) then implies that for all




















µ(x) # ¡1 as x # a (a was assumed to be a natural boundary) and ¼(k) < 0 we ¯nd
that equation (L'µ(Rµ
r¼))(x) = 0 has a unique root x¤
















r¼)(x)='µ(x)g. Given this observation it is now straightforward to estab-




1, Vµ(x) ¸ 0 for all x 2 I, and (Gµ
rVµ)(x) + ¼(x) · 0 for all x 2 Infx¤
µg. Therefore, it dominates
the value of the optimal exit problem (2.5). However, since the proposed value is attained by the
admissible threshold policy ¿(x¤
µ;b) we ¯nd that it coincides with the value of the optimal exit problem
(2.5) and, therefore, that ¿(x¤





























for all x ¸ x¤
µ and, therefore, that the value is nondecreasing. Establishing the claims of part (B) is
entirely analogous. Finally, part (C) follows directly from Theorem 4.1.
F Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. (A) Before proceeding in the proof of the alleged results, we ¯rst notice that since the ter-
mination payo® now reads as g(x) = (Rµ
r¼)(x) the auxiliary functional F
y



















Ãµ(y) x < y:
Hence, applying Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 proves that F
y
µ (x) ¸ F
y
^ µ (x) for all x 2 I, y 2 I, and
^ µ ¸ µ. Along the lines of our Theorem 3.3, this shows that argminµ2[¡·;·]fF
y
µ (x)g = ·.
26Having established the monotonicity of the functionals F
y
µ (x) as functions of Knigtian uncer-
tainty, we now derive the value Vµ(x) under the assumption that ¼ 2 L1

























µ(x) T 0; x S ¼¡1(0):
In light of the assumed monotonicity and boundary behavior of the cash °ow ¼(x) we observe that
(LÃµ(Rµ
r¼))(x) > 0 for all x · ¼¡1(0). Let x > k > ¼¡1(0). Invoking the additivity of the functional
(LÃµ(Rµ
























as x " b, since Ã0
µ(x)=S0
µ(x) " 1 when b is a natural boundary for the underlying di®usion (cf.
Borodin and Salminen (2002), p. 19). Therefore, equation (LÃµ(Rµ
r¼))(x) = 0 has a unique root
on x¤

















r¼)(x)=Ãµ(x)g and, therefore, that F
x¤
µ
µ (x) ¸ (Rµ
r¼)(x) for all x 2 I.
Moreover, we ¯nd that F
x¤
µ






µ§)j < 1, (AµF
x¤
µ
µ )(x) ¡ rF
x¤
µ
µ (x) = 0




µ )(x) ¡ rF
x¤
µ





constitutes a r-excessive majorant of the exercise payo® (Rµ
r¼)(x). Since Vµ(x) is the smallest of
these majorants, we have that Vµ(x) · F
x¤
µ
µ (x) for all x 2 I. In order to establish the opposite

























all x 2 I and, therefore, that Vµ(x) = F
x¤
µ
µ (x). Moreover, it is clear from the proof of Theorem 4.1
that in this case infµ2[¡·;·] Vµ(x) = V·(x) = V (x). Establishing part (B) is analogous. Finally, the
negativity of the sign of the relationship between higher Knightian uncertainty and the value of the
optimal timing policy follows directly from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2.
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